Prosecution witness testifies about DNA identification of bone tissue

On 30th September and 1st of October, Dr. Reza Gerretsen testified for the Prosecution, another witness from the Dutch Forensic Institute (NFI). Dr. Gerretsen is a forensic anthropologist who, some seven years after the 2005 bomb explosion, made a selection of human bone tissue for DNA analysis of materials that had not previously rendered a clear DNA profile. This witness had prepared expert reports with his NFI colleague Dr. Kokshoorn. As a forensic anthropologist, his work focuses on the forensic identification of bones, teeth and areas of the body surrounding those tissues. He examined specimen of body parts, trying to identify what they were, whether they were human bones or not. He would then determine whether it contained sufficient DNA for analysis and determination and send it on to a DNA specialist for profiling.

[screnshot of witness Dr. Gerretsen]

The difficulty, as with so many other expert witnesses, is here that the underlying expert reports are not publicly available, though they are not confidential and openly discussed in the courtroom. This makes it especially difficult to understand the proceedings, specifically where they concern the details of the experts' reports.

In responding to questions by Prosecution counsel Mr. Milne, Dr. Gerretsen testified about the long process of DNA identification of bone and soft tissue. With respect to items that could not have previously been profiled, six clear DNA profiles were identified by this method. One of the DNA profiles belonged to a person who is still alive, but was injured during the attack.

The witness testifies on the possible deterioration of human bone tissue through storage, freezing and defrosting, the temperature it has been stored in, the acidity, the presence of bacteria

Part of defence counsel's cross-examination on 1st October evolves around the administrative aspects of the DNA profiling examination. The witness testifies that the budget for the NFI's examination was limited, and that certain pieces of tissue may have led to identification, but that it had been decided by the Office of the Prosecutor not to have them submitted for DNA analysis, even though they may have had fruitful results.

Two members of the Dutch forensic team that investigated the crime scene in August 2005: Anick van de Craats and Jan Kuitert

Dr Anick van de Craats (who testified on 28 August and 1 September 2014) works at the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). In 2005 she was working as a forensic explosives scientists at the NFI and she was part of the team that was sent to investigate the crime scene in Beirut following a request of UNIIIC to the Dutch government. The team was tasked to find physical evidence and reconstruct the improvised explosive device (IED) which caused the explosion. One of the tasks of Dr van de Craats was to write the report on behalf of the Dutch forensic team. This team was further composed of six colleagues with forensic police experience.

The team was in Beirut from 11 August until 25 September 2005, that is some six months after the explosion occurred. They checked all vehicles within a specifically defined crime zone, searching for objects outside and underneath the cars. After the cars were searched, they were removed from the crime scene. During the first three weeks the focus was on searching the crime scene; after that the team analysed and sorted all vehicle parts that were collected from the crime scene. They were assisted by other experts in recognising the vehicle parts, including Prosecution witness Mr. Geyer (click here for a summary of his evidence). Dr van de Craats took swabs from some of the items which may have had explosive residue upon them. These swabs were taken in consultation with Dr Murray, another Prosecution witness, and subsequently sent to Northern Ireland for Dr Murray to analyse, whilst separate samples were also examined by the NFI to compare the results.

Dr van de Craats explains that it is important to look at the overall damage at the crime scene, including the damage to the buildings and vehicles, to establish the type of explosion that occurred. The damage to the buildings and vehicles showed that the explosion occurred because of a detonation and had an enormous high velocity, which caused the complete destruction of all material in the near vicinity. This also explains why there is a crater. A detonation also can cause ceilings or walls to be moved, and this type of damage was found at the St. George and Byblos hotels. Further, the horizontal perforations of the vehicles show that there had been a horizontal blast force. Based on this and other characteristics of the crime scene (bent columns at the St. Georges Hotel and a slided wall at the Byblos Hotel) Dr van de Craats concludes that it must have been an explosion above the ground. The movement of asphalt is not conclusive for either an underground or above-ground explosion.

The team also had the opportunity to examine the convoy vehicles, which were retained at the Helou barracks, a guarded police compound; although these vehicles were covered by blue plastic they showed sever rust. The damage to these cars was used to determine their position to the explosion centre. The team compared the remains of the three most damaged vehicles: the black Mercedes 404, the Red Ford and the Mitsubishi Canter. They concluded that the Mitsubishi Canter was the most damaged vehicle, with only small parts being recovered, therefore supporting the hypothesis that this was the bomb-carrying vehicle. Further, the Red Ford could not have contained the IED because the damage to the carcass came from the rear left and thus from the outside the vehicle.

During cross-examination, Mr. Edwards (representing the interests of the accused Badreddine) is confronting the witness with the differences between the position of vehicles at the maps of the crime scene drawn by the Dutch team, and the maps of the Lebanese police (ISF). According to a comparison presented by Mr. Edwards, the difference between the maps show addition and removal of vehicles. Dr van de Craats explains that it is difficult to state if these are real differences, given a lack of a common reference points, and if so, what would be the reason for those differences. Also, she states that these differences do not affect the conclusions of her report. Dr van de Craats further explains that at the time of the investigations they already noted the differences, but “we talked to the UNIIIC investigators and we all accepted the fact that we could only start our crime scene search six months after the explosion occurred, and our task was to record the crime scene at that moment as best as we could.” The Prosecution does not dispute that the convoy vehicles and at least one other vehicle were moved; further, it takes the view that the variations in the maps are “simply map-drawer's perspectives”.

The Dutch forensic team further included a number of police officers with specific crime scene experience, one of them being Jan Kuitert, a (now retired) crime scene investigator from the police with experience in explosives. Jan Kuitert gave evidence on 11 September 2014. He explains that each Dutch team member was assigned 4-5 Lebanese police investigators, and they systematically searched the crime scene; the team inspected and removed over 100 vehicles, and located and photographed numerous car parts.

[screenshot of witness Jan Kuitert]

The overall conclusions of the Dutch report "Forensic investigation of the explosion which occurred on the 14th of February, 2005, in Beirut, Lebanon." of 30 September 2005 are as follows:

(i) Detonation of high explosive “The damage inflicted on the buildings, vehicles, surrounding lamp-posts and other objects in the vicinity of the explosion site demonstrate that a large amount of high explosives was activated and detonated to the left side in front of the main entrance of the St. Georges Hotel on the Rue Minet el Hos' n. This detonation set fire to many vehicles within a distance of 20 to 30 metres of the explosion centre. From the damage pattern it was clear that it was one explosion of a charge of high explosive.”

(ii) The Mitsubishi Canter as bomb vehicle “Regarding the physical evidence recovered, the human remains identified by Dr Ayoub, the HSBC security video, and the damage on vehicles parked on the road, the most likely scenario is that a Mitsubishi Canter van containing the improvised explosive device (IED) was activated when the Hariri convoy of six vehicles drove by. The engine number of this Mitsubishi Canter was found among the debris on the crime scene. This number led to the vehicle registration number and the production date of Mitsubishi Canter van which was manufactured in Japan.

No remains of the constituents of the IED have been found among the debris, apart from the vehicle parts of the Mitsubishi Canter in which the IED was most probably placed. Because of the size of the explosion and the exploded charge this is not unexpected. A few damaged parts of circuit boards have been recovered which may be related to an activation mechanism. However, these circuit boards should first be examined by electronics experts, who might give an indication of the origin and application of these boards.”

(iii) Location of convoy vehicles and bomb vehicle “When the explosive device was activated, the Mitsubishi Canter was parked almost in line with the other parked vehicles along the pavement in front of the St. Georges Hotel with the front of the vehicle facing west. It was not parked fully in line judging from the direction of the explosion force acted on the red Ford vehicle which was most likely parked directly in front of the Mitsubishi. This red Ford vehicle was most severely damaged from the left rear side which means that the Mitsubishi could not have been parked fully in line with the red Ford vehicle.

Of the six convoy vehicles, the black Mercedes numbered 404 was closest to the explosion centre when the IED detonated. The direction of the explosive force on this vehicle was from the right side, meaning it was most likely located alongside the Mitsubishi. From the damage patterns it can be stated that the vehicles 401, 402, and 403, the latter with Hariri and Fuleihan as occupants, had just passed by the Mitsubishi when the explosion occurred. Vehicles 405 and 406 have been damaged most severely at the right front side, meaning that these vehicles had not yet driven by the Mitsubishi at the moment of the detonation.“

(iv) Activation of IED “Regarding the physical evidence presented in this report and the fact that small human remains of an up-to-now unidentified person have been found and no large body parts, such as legs, feet, or underarms, the most likely scenario for the activation of the IED is a suicide bomber. Another only less likely possibility is that of a remotely controlled device. However, no residues of such device have been recovered from the crime scene.”

Mr. Kuitert gives a good explanation of the most important caveat to the conclusions of the report because of possible contamination of the crime scene by stating that “when you carry out an investigation half a year after the incident and even if the crime scene has been under surveillance during that time, you can never be sure that the crime scene is as it was shortly after the explosion.”

Explosive Experts of the Lebanese Police: Mr. Walid Othman, Mr. Mahmoud Khashab, and Mr. Husein Krayem

On 2, 3 and 4 September, Mr. Walid Othman testified for the Prosecution. Mr Othman is an explosive expert within the Explosives Bureau of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) of Lebanon, and since 1986 he has been involved in defusing or dismantling bombs, and visiting crime scenes after an explosion took place. Explosions occured on a daily basis in Lebanon.

On 14 February 2005, within half an hour after the explosion, Mr. Othman and his colleagues were at the crime scene. There was chaos, there were people and mechanical parts spread all over the place. The witness and the three other members of his team went into the crater, which was still hot, and found several pieces belonging to the vehicle in which the bomb had been placed. Various photographs confirm their presence in the crater. As soon as the witness looked at the damages, the crater and the crime scene itself, he thought that this was a car bomb that had exploded; this was based on his previous experience. The pieces of the vehicle were placed in bags and no photographs were taken of the pieces at that time; these pieces were taken to their office. They also took the measurements of the crater.

In the following days the witness and his colleagues collected more car parts at the crime scene, both from inside and outside the crater. The witness and his colleagues did not wear any special clothing or gloves, as they did not have the means and tools to deal with the crime scene as they currently have. They were mostly concerned with preserving the pieces as water started leaking into the crater. They drafted reports of their activities, which included photographs. These reports were sent to the military judge and also included a description of the destruction of buildings and the damage to cars of the convoy of Hariri. Various car parts were shown to mechanical experts at automobile companies and were identified as parts of Mercedes, Audi, Volkswagen and Mitsubishi vehicles. The parts from the crime scene were compared with original car parts. There was also one part that actually contained a Mitsubishi logo. Later on, upon request of international experts, Mr. Othman and his colleagues took four Mitsubishi car parts back to the crime scene. This was in order for the international experts to see the location where those pieces were found.

The following two witnesses, Mr. Mahmoud Khashab and Mr. Husein Krayem are colleagues of Mr. Othman, forming part of the same ISF team that investigated the crime scene. Further, the statement of the fourth member of the team, Mr. Joseph Safi, has been tendered pursuant to Rule 155. These testimonies are very similar in nature, even to the point that one wonders why the Prosecution decided to introduce the evidence of all of them, instead of selecting one or two team members to give evidence.

Mr. Mahmoud Khasab, testifying on 8 and 9 September, has been working as an explosive expert with the ISF since 1984. He gave evidence that after the inspection of the crime scene on 14 February 2005 they went to the military court to inform the government commissioner about the results of their inspection of the crime scene, and they showed him the metallic parts they had located. They received a rogatory letter from the investigative judge on the basis of which further inspections of the crime scene were held. Mr. Khasab further talked about the returning of car parts to the crime scene at the request of UNIIIC. According to Mr. Khasab, they relied on their memories in order to put back the parts at the crime scene (two days after the explosion however, they had already drawn a map with an indication of where the parts were found).

[screenshot of Prosecution witness Mahmoud Khasab]

In cross-examination, Mr. Khasab stated that, given that the convoy of Mr. Hariri was equipped with high-definition jammers, it would have been very difficult to detonate the explosives by remote control. The type of explosives used are classified as military. Like his colleagues, Mr. Khasab excludes the possibility that the explosion occurred underground. The witness further confirmed that he and his colleagues were the first to enter the crater, although there were already a lot of military and fire men present when they arrived. He further confirmed the primitive work methods at that time and the lack of tools to inspect or test the car parts they had found at the crime scene.  Mr. Hussein Krayem, who testified on 9 and 10 September, further clarified that the removal of evidence from the crime scene was not in accordance with their instructions; before 14 February 2005 applicable instruction 151 was never followed.

[screenshot of Prosecution witness Hussein Krayem]

These three witnesses provided the defence with the opportunity to highlight the (small) contradictions between their evidence, for example about the amount of car parts found in the crater, the amount of car parts that were returned to the crime scene (and also how often and when they were returned), and which team members participated in the meeting with the commissioner on the day of the explosion.

Defence lawyer's call for help rejected by Contempt Judge - STL status conference of 12 September

Judge Lettieri, the Contempt Judge, called the status conference today in the case against Al Akhbar Beirut SAL and Mr Al Amin. Present are, inter alia, Kenneth Scott, amicus curiae prosecutor participates in the hearing through video link and lead counsel for the defendants, Mr. Antonios Abou Kasm.

[screenshot of Mr. Kenneth Scott, amicus curiae prosecutor]

1. Absence of the accused

Judge Lettieri started off by indicating that initially, Mr. Al Amin, wished to represent himself as well as his co-defendant, the media company Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. However, given the behaviour of Mr. Al Amin, Contempt Judge Lettieri decided to request the Defence Office to appoint counsel to Mr. Al Amin and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. The accused was not present today to participate in the proceedings. The Contempt Judge indicated that the accused continues to have the right to address the Judge on the matter of his representation, but he has to be present in the courtroom to do so.

2. Preliminary matter raised by the defence

Counsel for the accused Mr. Kasm, speaking in Arabic and at times French, indicated that he would have preferred the amicus prosecutor to participate today in the courtroom, instead of through video link from the US. It was the amicus curiae who proposed the date for this conference, after all.  Judge Lettieri responds that for a status conference, this is not necessary, but this is envisaged in the Rules.

[screenshot of counsel for the accused Mr. Abou Kasm]

3. Case management

The amicus prosecutor has submitted a proposal for a timeline for the pre-trial phase. Mr Kasm responds that the defence must be given sufficient time for the preparation of the trial, including the filing of its pre-trial brief. He stressed that at the international level, it is the first time counsel is assigned against the accused's will in a contempt case. In all other cases where counsel have been assigned, the accused had been prosecuted for horrendous international crimes.

The Judge will give his decision on the timelines after he will have given his decision on jurisdiction.

4. Request by counsel for the defence rejected by the Contempt Judge

At the end of the hearing, counsel for the accused Mr Kasm called on the Judge for assistance. He is, understandably, in a very difficult position, given that he is imposed on the accused, and the accused do not want to have counsel representing them. Mr Kasm states: "I do all I can to fulfill my professional responsibilities, but I would like to call on you".

In a previous ruling, the Contempt Judge imposed the duty on defence counsel for the accused to disclose the evidence to the latter, while stressing at the same time "that counsel is reminded of their obligation to protect the confidentiality of the evidence and the proceedings".

In quite an emotive statement, counsel Kasm says that he is not there simply to serve the accused persons with documents only. He asks that the responsibility of disclosure to the accused be not only put on his shoulders, but also on the prosecutor and the Registrar, adding that the current proceedings are coming quite close to an in absentia trial. He adds that there is a risk that counsel, who bears the sole responsibility of sharing evidence with the accused, is then faced with a non-cooperative accused publicising such information illegally.

The Contempt Judge chose not to address the question, and simply responded: "You have chosen to be a lawyer, and you have accepted that responsibility!", thereby leaving counsel for the defence in a very difficult position. A position that he has knowingly taken upon himself, but nonetheless a very difficult situation that any lawyer in his situation would have problems with.

Resumption of the STL trial with a bomb explosion expert

On 26 August the Lebanon Tribunal resumed its proceedings after the summer recess had come to an end. The Prosecution continued with the presentation of its evidence by presenting its next witness in line, Dr. Konrad Schlatter. Dr. Schlatter was one of a group of Swiss forensic experts, himself being a bomb explosives expert. He attended crime site in Beirut in March 2005 at the request of Mr. Fitzgerald, head of the UN Fact Finding Mission to Lebanon.

[Screenshot of Dr. Schlatter at the STL.]

The witness explains that the questions asked by the UN Fact Finding Mission were limited; they were asked to say something about what kind of explosives were used, how much of it, and about the trigger mechanism of the device. Given the limited amount of time they were given, there was no possibility to do a wider research than the parameters given by the Fact Finding Mission.

Dr. Schlatter states that the crime scene was "significantly altered" when they arrived there in March of 2005. The witness and his co-experts were shown videos and pictures which showed the first few hours after the explosion. There were a lot of emergency personnel and other persons on the spot, and as a result of that, evidence had been moved. When they arrived at the scene, the convoy vehicles were no longer there. And in the course of their work, Lebanese officials showed them pieces of evidence which had clearly been removed from the scene of the crime before they had arrived. Normally, at a crime scene it is indicated where people are not allowed to walk; that had clearly not been the case here.

The witness is shown several photographs of the crater and its surroundings.

[Screenshot of the crime scene.]

The witness testifies about the size of the bomb crater; indicating that the diameter crater was approximately 12.5 meters, and some 2.2 meters deep. Also, the vehicles from the convoy were taken away from the scene, thereby contaminating the evidence. The witness is further asked by Judge Akoum about the destruction of evidence and how that could have been avoided. The witness indicates that simple precautions could have been taken, such as covering the crime scene, so as to protect it from rain and wind. But more importantly, the evidence should have been collected at a very early stage so as to avoid its destruction or altering.

The witness describes in great detail his report and the photographs annexed to it, and in response to questions posed by the Prosecution and judges today, about the effect of the explosion on the buildings surrounding the explosion site.

The witness and the other experts were looking for more metal parts of the vehicle carrying the bomb in the crater. One item they found was a metal part with a Mitsubishi logo on it (see red marking on screenshot below).

[Screenshot of metal part with Mitsubishi logo found on the explosion site.]

Another item was retrieved; the witness also joined the diving team and found more metal parts. They picked up parts from the bottom of the sea near the St. Georges building. Dr. Schlatter also explains why he believes the explosion took place above the ground and that the amount of explosives used was approximately 1,000 kilograms.

In cross-examination, the following day, Dr. Schlatter confirms that the investigations team he formed part of did not have a lot of time for its investigations of the explosion, and the crime scene had been altered, recognising that in the immediate aftermath of an explosion, the saving of lives and removing the dead takes priority over safeguarding the crime scene.

Expert witness Geyer about identification of vehicle parts

On 16 and 17 July 2014, Prosecution witness Gerhard Geyer came to testify about the identification of Mitsubishi vehicle parts. Mr Geyer has worked for Mitsubishi Motors Germany since 1990. He was asked to investigate the vehicle parts in Beirut, where he traveled to in 2005 and subsequently drafted a report.

First, the Trial Chamber had to decide whether this witness would testify as an expert witness or as a witness-of-fact. The defence for Badreddine, Mr Iain Edwards, called into question this witness's expertise, but the judges decided nonetheless that Mr Geyer qualified as an expert witness under Rule 161 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in that he had some form of specialised knowledge, experience or training.

[screenshot of Mr Geyer at the STL]

In his testimony, and whilst being confronted with several exhibits consisting of car parts, Mr Geyer identified fragments of the vehicle that may have carried the bomb to the place of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Those parts were likely to have belonged to a Mitsubishi Canter van, according to Mr Geyer.

Mr Geyer was shown from the CCTV in the tunnel in Beirut through which the van had allegedly traveled in the direction of the location of the assassination (see here for an earlier overview of expert witness Robyn Fraser on the CCTV footage of the lorry through the tunnel). He indicated that it was not possible for him to confirm that the lorry that traveled through the tunnel was indeed a Mitsubishi Canter van.

The testimony of Mr Geyer forms an important aspect of the Prosecution case in tying together the vehicle that they allege carried the bomb to the assassination. The Prosecution alleges that the defendant Ayyash was involved in the purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van in Tripoli (see article in the Daily Star).

Last witness before the STL summer recess: Mr Mohammed Kheireddine (22 and 23 July 2014)

The Prosecution started with a summary of the statement given by Mr Kheireddine, who is a police officer within the Internal Security Forces (ISF) of Lebanon:

“At the time [of the attack], his job was to attend at crime scenes and to take finger-prints, biological evidence, and pictures. On 14 February 2005, Mr. Kheireddine was working inside his office at the Helou barracks when he heard an explosion. He and his team were ordered to attend the crime scene at the St. Georges area. His team took pictures, a video, and notes of what they observed at the crime scene. Mr. Kheireddine and his team also went to the hospitals to take pictures of the deceased victims and to obtain finger-prints of the deceased when possible. Approximately a week later, Mr. Kheireddine was called to the crime scene to take pictures and to obtain a sample of a partial hand that was recovered from under the rubble. Mr. Kheireddine also took pictures of the crater and objects found in it. Further, he went to Helou barracks to take pictures of car parts and other plastic and metal parts. A month after the explosion, Mr. Kheireddine and explosives technicians went to the St. Georges Beach Club to inspect if any evidence remained, but they did not find anything.”

[screenshot of Mr Kheireddine appearing by video-link before the STL]

Further, Mr Kheireddine together with his ISF colleagues drafted a report on the forensic examination and technical inspections carried out by them on the day of the attack. This report contains observations and photographs of the crime scene (including bodies, the crater, and damaged vehicles), the morgue at the hospital and metal parts collected from the crime scene by the explosive experts. There is also a video taken by a member of Mr Kheireddine’s team on 14 February 2005 at the crime scene, and another report written by him and a colleague on 1 March 2005 about their attendance at the crime scene in order to take samples and photographs of the remains of a human palm that had been found buried under some wreckage.

After this short examination-in-chief, Mr Andreas O'Shea for the Merhi Defence started cross-examining the witness by asking some questions about the witness’ experience and training within the police. Mr Kheireddine explained that this was the first explosion crime scene he visited, that he was leading a team of three, with one taking the video, and the other two taking photographs and notes. The original notes were destroyed, as everything was included in the final report; this was their standard practice.

Mr O’Shea also questioned the witness about the content of the photographs and the video taken at the crime scene, showing among others firemen, severely damaged buildings, the crater filled with water, and people in and around the crater. However, this line of questioning did not seem to result in anything other than what the images already show, that is the limited securing of the crime scene (with only parts of the crime scene marked by tape, at least shortly after the attack), the presence of many people at the crime scene, and experts collecting items from the crime scene without special gloves. Also, a bulldozer was used to remove bodies from the crime scene, and, according to the witness, nowadays a bulldozer would not be used to remove a dead body while the inspection at the crime scene is still ongoing. The witness further confirmed that a very large crime scene should have been divided into zones, and should have a coordination tent where different services can meet and coordinate their efforts, but both measures were not taken at that time.

During the cross-examination of Mr Edwards for the Defence for Mr Badreddine, it was further clarified that after the investigations into the explosion of 2005, 'lessons have been learned' by the Lebanese authorities. Since then the police have been further trained and improved procedures have been implemented for the investigation of a crime scene after such a large explosion.