Closing arguments in second contempt of court case against journalists

On 13 May closing argument were presented in the contempt of court case against the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar Beirut and its editor-in-chief Ibrahim Al Amin.

The Amicus Curiae Prosecutor Mr Scott summarised its case: Al-Akbhar and Ibrahim Al Amin intentionally and willfully interfered with the administration of justice by their extreme and irresponsible conduct, that is disclosing the identity of alleged confidential witnesses. Mr Scott repeated that the case is not an attack on free speech or the entire Lebanese media (for criticising the tribunal), but directed against this specific criminal behaviour of the accused.

[screenshot of the court room during contempt proceedings - 1 March 2016]

The Prosecutor further explained that according to the law it does not need to prove any actual harm or interference, but only the objective likelihood that this will occur. The Prosecutor argued that the contempt judge has excluded evidence on the basis of narrow common law considerations whilst other international tribunals have taken a more liberal approach. According to him, the evidence must be considered as a whole and in a holistic evaluation, and hearsay evidence should be taken in consideration.

Conclusively, the Prosecutor stated that the press publications by the accused did create an objective likelihood that public confidence in the administration of justice by this Tribunal would be undermined; the evidence presented by the Prosecution, including the testimony of Dr Brouwer, shows this. The accused knew the effect of these disclosures, and the undermining of public confidence actually was the purpose of the publications.

Mr Abou Kasm, lead counsel for the Defence, started his closing speech by arguing that the Prosecution is trying to turn the case into a political trial; by linking the accused to Hezbollah, and by claiming that Hezbollah is an alleged source of threat to witnesses at the tribunal. The Defence denies any links between Al-Akhbar and Hezbollah. Further, the Defence stated that the situation in Lebanon is stable and save, contrary to the claims made by the Prosecution about the unstable security situation in which the names of the witnesses were disclosed. The Prosecution failed to prove the mens rea and actus rea of the accused; also it did not establish any suffered harm or the undermining of public confidence. Mr Kasm concluded that the Prosecutor failed to prove that Al-Akhbar or Mr Al Amin intended to obstruct the course of justice or that these publications undermined the public confidence in the ability of the Tribunal to keep its information confidential; therefore there should be an acquittal for both accused.

The case is now closed and awaiting judgment.

Continuation of evidence by representative of Lebanese company Alfa

PRH707 has been working at the Lebanese mobile network company Alfa since April 2012. He has been delegated as a representative witness of Alfa by the Minister of Telecommunications of Lebanon. He has already testified earlier this year (see our blog of 21 March 2016), and has returned to the STL for the continuation of his examination-in-chief and cross-examination (which took place on 18-22 April and 3-4 May). The telephone data provided by Alfa is used by the Prosecution to attribute certain telephone use, movement and communications to the accused, activities which the Prosecution links to the terrorist attack of 14 February 2005.

The witness answered some clarifying questions by the Prosecution, including questions about the complaint logs of Alfa for 2004 and 2005 (which have not been kept), the change in cell ID of stations destroyed because of the war (the cell ID has been changed sometimes, if the location of the station changed), and the options for invoice payment in 2004 and 2005. The witness acquired information by consulting his colleagues from various departments and teams within Alfa. The witness also testified about the origin, creation process and accuracy of a number of documents produced by Alfa.

Mr Young, counsel representing the interests of the accused Sabra, questioned the witness about, among others, a big central database that has been created in 2014 by Alfa, the impossibility to confirm most of the values provided for 2004 or 2005, and the driving tests done by the Alfa. Mr Young also pointed the witness to wrongly included or missing cell cites in the best server maps created by the Prosecution for 2005. According to the witness, these maps reflect the reality of the coverage for 2005 by 60-70%. Counsel also asked the witness about a directed re-try: the situation in which a call is connected to a neighbouring cell if the best serving cell is too busy. In this case, the call data record will not record the best serving cell.

Ms Dimitri, representing the interests of the accused Badreddine, questioned the witness about the manner in which he was interviewed by the Prosecution, as the Defence is seeking to obtain disclosure of investigator's notes, draft statements and lists of questions in relation to these interviews. During the examination of witness PRH707, the Defence did receive various additional e-mails from the Prosecution, although it is seeking for the disclosure of further material. Part of the cross-examination of Ms Dimitri was postponed to allow her to analyse the material that has been disclosed. This might lead to the need for the witness to return and answer some further questions by the Defence in the near future.

The examination of this witness covered many exceedingly technical issues, which were discussed at great length and through the use of a large set of documents. The purpose of the Defence is to show the inaccuracies, uncertainties and mistakes in the data, which would have consequences for the Prosecution's theory, which is built on this information. Mr Young explained that their team takes the position that most of the key cell site data for 2005 is completely unknown, and that the Prosecution is relying upon theoretical predictive coverage on the basis of doubtful (shape file) values. According to the Defence, the best server plots are a poor representation of both the actual coverage and the location of a phone user, and therefore cannot be used for the forensic purposes the Prosecution is using them.

Evidence on the telephone networks: Thematic summary and witness Gary Platt

Thematic summary

On 4 April 2016 the Trial Chamber decided, after hearing from the parties (with only two Defence teams opposing) that because of the factual and technical complexity of the trial, periodic in-court thematic summaries of evidence will be held. This seems to be an advantage for the Prosecution, which has to present an active case and now has been given the opportunity to stress its interpretation of the evidence or add further detail and interpretation. Furthermore, one wonders whether it would have been preferable to have a lengthier indictment or Pre-Trial Brief or more detail in the bar table motions when requesting the admission of specific evidence instead of using additional court time, especially in light of the trial's length thus far.

The Prosecution provided an overview of the documentary and witness evidence in relation to the interconnected red, blue, green and yellow telephone networks. The Prosecution explained their theory as to which telephones from which networks belong to which accused, when the SIM cards were (de)activated, their user information, and their recharge information as well as handset acquisition and history. For example, all telephones from the yellow network were charged from sequential top-up cards, therefore showing their interconnection. Three phones operated as a closed circuit within the green network which, in total, consisted of 18 devices. These three phones operated from 13 October 2004 until 14 February 2005 (the day of Hariri's assassination) and belonged to the accused Merhi, Ayyash and Badreddine, according to the Prosecution's theory. Further, all eighteen phones of the green network were purchased with fraudulent IDs, activated as a group and deactivated because of lack of payment on 23 August 2005. The red network sim cards were all bought on 24 December, which is shown by the range of the bar codes. These were credited on one occasion only and the registered subscribers deny having bought these sim cards.

Witness Gary Platt (4-6, 14-15 April 2016)

After this summary of the Prosecution's evidence on the telephone networks, Prosecution investigator Gary Platt was heard as a witness in court. He was tasked by the Prosecution with organising the telecommunication evidence and putting it into evidentiary format. The questioning on 4 and 5 April dealt with the question of whether he is qualified as an expert in the field of telecommunications evidence and surveillance. The Defence challenged his expert qualifications, taking the position that he's an investigator and not an expert, and not impartial and objective as he is a member of the Prosecution. The Trial Chamber however declared Mr Platt an expert in two areas: the surveillance of criminal networks and the identification and organisation of covert communications networks.

[screenshot of witness Gary Platt testifying before the STL on 6 April 2016]

Mr Platt has been involved in telephone analysis during his work for the police in the United Kingdom. His work included monitoring individuals through cell site data for intelligence and police investigative purposes. He would use information coming from the telephone service providers. Mr Platt's police work involved dealing with the telephone evidence in the London transit bombings in 2005. He has been trained as a handset examiner and has experience in the field of (covert) surveillance. Mr Platt has given evidence in over forty criminal trials in the United Kingdom.

Mr Platt prepared five 'indictment reports' for the STL Prosecution. In these reports he used collected call data records, cell site evidence, subscriber details, customer notes, customer contracts, financial information (payment and top up records), and witness statements. Mr Platt also prepared a report on the functioning of the telephone networks in relation to the assassination of Hariri and a 'network analysis report', whose analysis is the topic of his current testimony in court.

The witness gave evidence on the level of covertness of the various phone networks allegedly used by the accused (red, green, yellow and blue). This covertness varies from no subscriber details to subscribers who knew nothing about the phone. He also explained the elements of organisation of the phone networks, including the financing, the setup and the cessation of the network, the areas in which the phones operated, and the level of call and SMS activity between the the network phones and with third parties, if any. The witness gave his thoughts about phone patterns typical for criminals, which according to him includes short duration of phone calls, switching off phones, and payment in cash. He also tried to explain why some of the phones of the green and blue network were used after the terrorist attack on 14 February 2005, including the possibility that these phones were used for another criminal purpose, and that they were considered to be covert enough to continue their usage. According to the witness, the patterns in usage, location, crediting, etc show the organisational structure of the four phone networks.

The evidence of this witness will be continued in the near future.

The Defence presents its witnesses in contempt case against journalist and newspaper

On 7 and 8 April the Defence for the Lebanese newspaper Akhbar Beirut and its editor-in-chief Ibrahim Al Amin presented its case.

The first witness called by the Defence was Mr Najib El-Kharrat. Newspaper Akhbar published personal information about this witness, including his picture, alleging that he was a Prosecution witness. The witness stated in court that the publication of the article did not have any effect on his professional or personal life. Further, the witness continued to have trust in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and claimed that no confidential information was disclosed. The cross-examination by the Prosecution was held in private session.

The second witness to appear was Mr Mahmoud Assi, another person who was discussed in an article in Akhbar newspaper. The article included his name and picture, and cited him as one of the Prosecution witnesses. Mr Assi was surprised by the article and contacted Akhbar newspaper. He met with the accused Mr Al Amin and a clarification submitted by the witness was subsequently published. The witness was not worried or afraid after the article was published, and he was not subject to any threat or harassment. His life was not affected because of the article, although some people were asking about his role in the case before the STL. Mr Assi works for a Lebanese insurance company, and goes to car accident sites as a court expert. He has testified in the main case, because one of the accused before the STL had called him to attend an accident location. The Prosecution established in cross-examination that his testimony was limited and technical, and not a direct issue for the Hariri case, thus suggesting that for this reason the impact of the article was limited.

Mr Elias Aoun was the third and last witness for the Defence. He is the President of the Order of the Lebanese Press Editors, an association acting on behalf of, and regulating, journalists. He was called to give evidence as an expert on freedom of press in Lebanon. He has written a report on the situation in Lebanon as to the press, freedom of press (also in relation to confidentiality of investigations), the obligations and norms governing the work of journalists, and journalism. The witness avoids answering most of the questions put to him. Instead he is making general comments about the prosecution of Lebanese journalists before the STL; in his view the accused should have been brought before a Lebanese court. The witness also holds the opinion that the STL has been selective in deciding not to prosecute journalists from other countries, and should instead focus on its main case concerning the bombing that killed Hariri and others.

The closing arguments by the parties in this second contempt case are scheduled to take place on 13 May. 

Second contempt case against Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar and its editor-in-chief Al Amin

On 24 February the second contempt case started at the STL, against Lebanese newspaper Akhbar Beirut and its editor-in-chief Ibrahim Al Amin. With the recent acquittal by the Appeals Panel of the accused in the first contempt case (see our previous blog), it will be very interesting to see whether the Prosecution has changed its case strategy.

 [screenshot of STL court room - 1 March 2016]

Opening statements
The second contempt case began with the opening statements by the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor and the Defence.

According to the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor Mr Kenneth Scott, Al-Akhbar newspaper and Mr Al Amin published on 15 January 2013 an article about Tribunal leaks, clearly identifying 17 alleged protected Prosecution witnesses in the Ayyash case, including full names and pictures. On 19 January the same accused published an article identifying another 15 alleged protected Prosecution witnesses. According to the Prosecutor, the accused were determined to obstruct justice and to interfere with the willingness of witnesses to testify. They knew exactly what they were doing. They republished the confidential information after they were ordered by the Tribunal to stop disseminating this information, and even after they were charged for contempt of court. According to the Prosecutor, Al-Akhbar published “what it deemed necessary to counter the international campaign of fabrication targeting the resistance”, that is Hezbollah.

[screenshot of the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor Mr Kenneth Scott - 1 March 2016]

The Defence in its opening statement highlighted the importance of the media and freedom of press, also in criticizing the work of the Tribunal and monitoring judicial proceedings. According to Defence counsel Mr Abou Kasm, the press in Lebanon has a tradition of publishing names of so-called confidential witnesses, acting as a watchdog to monitor judicial activities of Lebanese courts to redress any undesirable situations. It is not the intention of the Lebanese press to harm other persons, but it “considers the publication of any information unknown to the public as a means to set things right, encourage reform, and promote the rule of law, justice, and equality.” Further, Defence counsel stressed the lack of any relation between Al-Akhbar and Hezbollah, as confirmed by the secretary-general of Hezbollah and the critical content of the articles published in Al-Akhbar. Due to the current prosecution of Al-Akhbar “some news outlets opted for keeping clear of the STL, not daring to make any criticism, and others no longer care about covering the Tribunal's activities including the newspaper I was assigned to defend”. Defence counsel stressed the high number of attacks against and murders of journalists in Lebanon. According to the Defence there is no proof of actual threatening of witnesses or a loss of confidence of witnesses or the public in the Tribunal. The Prosecution is making a mistake because “[i]nstead of prosecuting those who leaked and continue to leak information, he is prosecuting those who published some of this information for journalistic purposes.” Al-Akhbar only published a sample to warn the Tribunal, a “legitimate criticism in line with the policy of the newspaper and in line with its editorial line, which refuses to ignore and turn a blind eye to wrong-doing.”

[screenshot of Defence counsel Mr Abou Kasm - 1 March 2016]

Prosecution's case
Also on 24 February, the evidence of the first Prosecution witness, AP14, was heard in closed session. Subsequently, Prosecution witness Mr John Comeau appeared before the court, with again most of his evidence being heard in private session. Mr Comeau worked for the Tribunal until December 2013 as the human source coordinator. Mr Comeau gave evidence about the two news articles in Al-Akhbar in January 2013, which according to him contain clearly identifiable purported Prosecution witnesses, including their full name, picture and other identifying information.

Further, on 25 February, witness Akram Rahal was called by the Prosecution. Mr Rahal worked for ISF (the Lebanese police) as an officer at the Central Criminal Investigation Sections until 2015. On 20 January 2013 Mr Rahal, together with his colleague, was tasked by the public prosecutor at the Lebanese Court of Cassation to serve a document from the Tribunal on Mr Al Amin and Mr Pierre Abi-Saab, the vice-editor of Al-Akhbar; this document was a decision of the President of the STL of 18 January 2013. The document was served on Mr Al Amin’s lawyer, Mr Saghieh, as they could not reach Mr Al Amin.

Subsequently, the evidence of witnesses AP07 (26 February), AP09 and AP06 (29 February) was heard in closed session. On 1 March witness Moukelad Al-Araki gave evidence about him being tasked by the Prosecution to monitor on a daily basis the availability of the Al-Akhbar articles on the internet. Mr Al-Araki started monitoring on 23 December 2015, and the articles remained available until this very date. The witness took daily screenshots of the online articles and sent them to the Prosecution. In February 2016 the witness noticed the blurring of the article of 15 January, and later also the blurring of the information and photos of the witnesses. Most of the cross-examination of this witness was in private session. This cross-examination apparently revealed that the witness had a contract with the Prosecution and was paid to perform his tasks. The Defence refused to continue its cross-examination because of this lack of transparency. Judge Lettieri suggested that the Defence could file a motion to exclude the evidence, but that nothing prevented it from continuing its cross-examination.

The last Prosecution witness to appear was Anne-Marie De Brouwer, who also testified in the first contempt case against Al Jadeed and Ms Al Khayat.. In that case, the Contempt Judge found that her evidence did not address the effects of disclosures in Lebanon or in the region, and therefore was of limited value. In the meantime she did look at some reports on Lebanon, but her views seem largely based on information and conclusions from Tribunal decisions to hold trials in absentia, quite a different topic and context.

Ms De Brouwer is an associate professor in (international) criminal law at Tilburg University and has been working in the field of victimology for more than 15 years. Ms De Brouwer has written a report addressing 
(i) the effects of disclosure of identifying information of (alleged) witnesses/victims in an international case on on actual or potential witness, and the public, and the impact on the administration of justice;
(ii)  the consequences of publishing identifying information of (alleged) witnesses/victims for actual/potential witnesses in international cases, taking into consideration geographical, political, ethnic or religious circumstances in the country of origin, as well as the nature of the crime(s) concerned, and the nature of their involvement;
(iii) "[t]he impact disclosure by national and local media of identifying information about alleged victims and/or witnesses related to or involved with international criminal tribunals located outside their residing country can have on actual or potential victims/witnesses, their sense of security and protection and willingness to testify as well as on the administration of justice."

Ms De Brouwer testified that from the experience at the various tribunals in relation to protective measures, it can be concluded that if the security situation is very difficult or if the political tensions are grave, it is very difficult for victims to feel safe. It is very difficult to testify against your own or another group, because if your identity is known, you will have serious concerns about your safety. According to Ms De Brouwer this analysis can also be applied to Lebanon, a very small and populated country where the media is very intensive, and with its delicate and sensitive security situation. The witness further explains in general the impact of disclosure of identities on witnesses and she comments on media articles about the publication by Al-Akhbar of the list of witnesses, and their impact on (potential) witnesses and public opinion.

This witness concluded the Prosecution's case. It is impossible to assess the strength of the Prosecution's case without knowing the evidence of most of the witnesses heard in closed session. The Defence case, if any, is scheduled to start on 7 April.

Full acquittal by STL Appeals Panel in first contempt case against journalist and media company

In its judgment of 8 March 2016, the Appeals Panel partly granted the appeal by the Defence, and reversed the conviction for contempt of court of Ms Al Khayat. This results in a full acquittal of both accused (Ms Al Khayat and company Al Jadeed) for contempt of court.

In this case, Al Jadeed TV broadcasting corporation and its deputy head of news, Ms Al Khayat, were charged with two counts of contempt of court. The television station produced a series of episodes on supposed witnesses of the Tribunal. The two accused were charged with publishing information on purported confidential witnesses in the main case, thereby undermining public confidence in the Tribunal’s ability to protect the confidentiality of information about, or provided by, (potential) witnesses. Al Jadeed and Ms Al Khayat were also charged with failure to comply with a court order to remove that particular information from Al Jadeed's website and its YouTube Channel. In his Judgment (subject to the current appeal), the Contempt Judge acquitted Al Jadeed on both counts; Ms. Al Khayat was found guilty on the second count and sentenced to pay a fine of 10,000 euro. 

[the accused Ms Al Khayat and her defence lawyers in court - screenshot taken on 18 June 2015]

Although the Appeals Panel identified a number of mistakes made by the Contempt Judge in evaluating the evidence, in its view none of these factual errors had any impact on the conclusions that could be drawn from the evidence. For example, the Appeals Panel was critical about the evaluation of the evidence of two witnesses who had been portrayed as Tribunal witnesses in the episodes, and who also testified that they had suffered negative consequences because of this (Appeals Judgment, paras. 99-102). However, the Appeals Panel still upheld the finding by the Contempt Judge that the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor had not proven beyond reasonable doubt (part of) the actus reus of count 1, namely the existence of an objective likelihood of the episodes undermining the public's confidence in the Tribunal's ability to protect confidential information (Appeals Judgment, para. 104). Further, the Appeals Panel also found that the Contempt Judge was not unreasonable in requiring  the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor "to prove, as a distinct element of the offence, the objective likelihood of the public's confidence being undermined", which serves as a link between the purported disclosures by the Accused and the interference with the administration of justice (Appeals Judgement, para. 95). The Appeals Panel therefore upheld the acquittal for both accused on count 1.

Count 2 deals with a disclosure in breach of a court order; therefore, the undermining of the public's confidence is no element of the crime. The Contempt Judge found Ms Al Khayat guilty for her failure to comply with a court order to remove the episodes from the internet. He used circumstantial evidence to establish that Ms Al Khayat had received the court order by e-mail, as there exists no direct proof of receipt and Ms Al Khayat denies receiving this e-mail. The Appeals Panel explained that "when the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence to prove the facts constituting the elements of an offence (here the mens rea) by inference, that inference must be the only reasonable conclusion available from the evidence" (Appeals Judgment, para. 167). Consequently, the Appeals Panel reversed the finding by the Contempt Judge because he failed to consider the existence of these other reasonable inferences; for example, that the e-mail did not reach Ms Al Khayat's e-mail without triggering any notification for the sender, or that the e-mail ended up in the junk folder of Ms Al Khayat's e-mail account (Appeals Judgment, para. 168). The Appeals Panel thus concluded that the Amicus Curiae Prosecutor failed to prove that Ms Al Khayat had the requisite mens rea for Count 2 (Appeals Judgment, para. 172).

An interesting aspect of the Judgment is that the Appeals Panel (with Judge Akoum dissenting) confirmed that the applicable law in relation to the elements for the attribution of criminal liability to legal persons is Lebanese law and that these were foreseeable to the corporate accused Al Jadeed (Appeals Judgment, paras. 188-196). The majority of the Appeals Panel found that the other main sources mentioned in Rule 3(A) on the interpretation of the Rules - principles of interpretation laid down in customary international law, international standards on human rights and the general principles of international criminal law and procedure - "are ill-suited, in the present case, to address the precise question of how the acts and conduct of natural persons are to be attributed to legal persons" (Appeals Judgment, para. 191). After the Appeals Chamber previously held that the Tribunal held jurisdiction over legal persons for contempt of court, emphasizing developing international standards on corporate criminal liability, the apparent failure to identify the elements of the crime through sources of international law seems to direct towards a different conclusion (see also one of our previous blogs criticizing the manner in which the Appeal Chamber came to its jurisdiction finding). Judge Akoum in his separate opinion also explained that "the absence of clear and unambiguous provisions setting out the elements of corporate responsibility" should result in Al Jadeed's acquittal, as required by the principle of legality. Previously, Judge Akoum also dissented the majority view that the Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over legal persons for contempt.

In another interesting, and completely different, dissenting opinion, Judge Nosworthy finds that a conviction of Al Jadeed should have been entered on count 2, but on the basis of the acts and conduct of Ms Al Bassam, Ms Al Khayat's direct superior officer. According to Judge Nosworthy, Ms Al Bassam was notified of the order, had the ability and authority to remove the episodes from Al Jadeed TV's online platforms, and her conduct is attributable to Al Jadeed (although for this last conclusion Judge Nosworthy has to adopt a purposive/teleological approach to the interpretation and selection of Lebanese case law, which seems to be quite a stretch in view of the legality principle). Interestingly, and Judge Nosworthy also refers to this in her opinion, Ms Al Bassam has not been charged before the Tribunal. Therefore, if this line of reasoning had been followed, Al Jadeed would have been convicted for the acts of a person who had not been given an opportunity to defend herself before a court of law. Strictly speaking this would not have been a violation of the rights of the accused, with Al Jadeed and not Ms Al Bassam being charged. However, one wonders whether this approach is the most favorable in view of these same fair trial rights, with Ms Al Bassam's acts and conduct being the only basis for the conviction of Al Jadeed. Her defence in person would then certainly constitute an important, if not essential, contribution to a fair and balanced outcome of the proceedings.

January & February at the STL: Prosecution investigator Macleod and a representative of Alfa

Alasdair Macleod (12-14 January 2016)

Mr Macleod is an investigator for the Prosecution, who has previously worked for UNIIIC, the ICTY and the British government. The witness is called to court at the request of the Defence to be examined about his investigative work, including interviewing witnesses and taking statements. More specifically, the witness is questioned about the statements he took in relation to Abu Adass (the person who made the false claim of responsibility), the delivery of the video with the claim of responsibility to Al-Jazeera, and the Al Qaeda 13 group. The witness was tasked with finding evidence on what happened with Abu Adass. The Defence for Mr Sabra asked the witness about these investigations, which again led to discussions about the relevance of the witness confirming the content of statements given by other persons (see also the cross-examination of Ms Kamei, discussed in our previous blog).

Further, most of the cross-examination of this witness remains unknown or impossible to follow, as a large part of his evidence is in closed session, and in open session the names of the persons about whom the witness was questioned, were not revealed to the public. The Defence for Mr Sabra asked the witness to comment on his investigation work in relation to certain persons and information that seem relevant for the Defence case, for example their alternative theories on Abu Adass’ role. The cross-examination of this witness is still to be continued.

[screenshot of hearing at the STL - 28 October 2015]

Closed session

On 20-22 and 26-29 January the Court heard the evidence of a witness in closed session.

PRH707 (29 January, 9-12, 15-18 February 2016)

The evidence of PRH707 was heard in open session, although the witness’ identity was kept away from the public. PRH707 is an electrical engineer and has worked in telecommunication for about 25 years. The witness has worked at the Lebanese mobile network company Alfa since April 2012. He has been delegated as a representative witness of Alfa by the Minister of Telecommunications of Lebanon. Alfa is a company that manages the mobile phone network owned by the Lebanese state. At Alfa the witness deals with corporate reporting and the technical systems. 

PRH707 gave evidence about three types of records generated by Alfa in the ordinary course of business: call data records, cell site-related data and the database holding customer information (the so-called "subscriber database"). The Prosecution relies on these records to link certain telephones to the accused. A discussion was held in court if part of the witness' written statement could be tendered into evidence - in addition to the evidence he will give in court - with the Defence objecting to this. The Chamber still has to decide on this matter, but the amount of discussion shows that this is an important witness to the parties, with the telecommunication evidence constituting the core of the Prosecution's case. The witness explained that in order to create his statement, he consulted people from other departments within his company. These requests included confirming certain business records and procedures.

The unit in charge of the subscriber database does not fall under the authority of the witness and therefore he cannot say anything about its accuracy. The witness explained that two years ago they set up a new system to ensure that the database of subscribers is more reliable than it used to be. Identification papers, a photograph and personal collection of the card are now required to obtain a SIM card. The information in the subscriber database is for example used by the Alfa call centre dealing with customer complaints. The witness explained the procedure at Alfa in relation to the sale, activation, payment and recharging of pre-paid and post-paid SIM cards.

PRH707 further explained that the call data records were created for the billing system. Alfa only used the fields useful for this billing system, although other fields could be interesting for marketing for example. The witness explained the functioning of the data warehouse system, which is used to store information used for statistical or marketing purposes. This is the one of the three sources of call data records, in addition to the raw records themselves (with the main source being the switching centres, which create a call data record for each event passing through) and the billing system.

The cell site-related data is used by the team that is dealing with the coverage of specific areas (the radio team). The witness gave evidence about how new stations or new sites can be built to extend or improve the coverage. Various values were manually measured after the installation of the station, including the value of the azimuth, or the direction of the antenna. Customer complaints or the construction of additional stations occasionally required the modification of these antennae. The recorded values for 2004 and 2005 cannot be double-checked by Alfa.

About the functioning of the Alfa network, PRH707 explained that in principle a mobile phone will connect with the best serving cell or signal, although a low percentage of handsets will connect to another signal, causing complaints about the quality of the sound. Normally the best serving cell would be the closest geographically, although for example buildings blocking the signal or the station's limited capacity will create exceptions. Alfa used a software program called Aircom Asset to create maps showing the strength of the signal and maps showing the best serving cell for a certain location, the so-called shape files. These shape files were created using different models predicting the coverage. PRH707 and his colleagues have prepared a diagram of the structure of the Alfa network in 2004-2005. The witness testified about the functioning of this network. 

The witness further gave evidence about how the company dealt with the requests for data and records by the Tribunal. PRH707  commented on many of the documents provided by Alfa to the Tribunal, confirming their authenticity and explaining their content and origin. This includes documents about telephones that were part of the blue, green, yellow and red networks used by the accused according to the Prosecution.

The examination-in-chief by the Prosecution of this witness took more than two weeks (although there was quite some repetitive evidence). The cross-examination of PRH707 has been postponed, but, in view of the importance of this evidence, will be expected to take very long as well.