On 4-7 May 2015 Mr
Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party and a
member of the Lebanese parliament, testified before the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. He was another friend, confident and ally of Rafiq Hariri and his testimony will again deal with the political background leading to the assassination of the Prime Minister. Mr Jumblatt was born in 1949 in Beirut and started his career as
a journalist with the An-Nahar newspaper. Since 1 May 1977 he is the leader of the
Progressive Socialist Party, which was founded by his father Kamal Jumblatt in 1949;
the party draws its main support from the Druze community. Mr. Jumblatt’s relationship with
Rafiq Hariri started in the mid-1980s, and continued to be a very firm and
strong relationship throughout the years. They used to meet at least once a
week on Sundays, and would have very frank and open discussions.
[Mr Walid Jumblatt testifying
on 4 May 2015, screenshot STL broadcast]
During his examination-in-chief Mr Jumblatt describes his relationship with the Syrian
regime. From 1977 until the signing of the Taif agreement in 1991, he was one of the main
allies of the Syrian regime and tried to work cooperatively with them. Throughout
the 1990s Mr Jumblatt had the same relationship with the Syrians, but in 1998
he (and other members of parliament) voted against the election of President Lahoud,
because they did not want to elect someone who was receiving orders from the
Syrians. The witness discussed this with Elias Hrawi and Rafiq Hariri, and they
felt that the security and military stranglehold of the Syrian regime over
Lebanon was increasing. They wanted an independent Lebanon with independent
institutions; however the intelligence system (the joint Syrian-Lebanese
security apparatus) did not allow any marge of maneuver.
The witness describes his two
meetings with Bashar Al-Assad, before he became the president of Syria, and Bashar’s
hostile tone of voice towards Hariri. The witness also describes another
meeting with Bashar Al-Assad in 2001 or 2002, arranged through Ghazi Kanaan,
who was keen on preserving the relationship between the witness and the Syrian
regime. Mr Jumblatt did not have a close relationship with Bashar, but did have
a strong relationship with other high-ranking persons in Syria with whom he was
cooperating before, including the Syrian Chief of Staff of the army Himat El-Chehabi
and the Syrian Vice-President Abdel Khaddam. The witness also met General Nasif
on a regular basis, who was hostile towards Hariri; the witness heard this from
Himat El-Chehabi.
In 2000 the circumstances changed as
a result of the Israeli withdrawal and the death of Hafez Al-Assad, and the
Maronite patriarch called for the withdrawal of the Syrians from Lebanon; Mr
Jumblatt gave a speech in parliament, stating that it is time for the Syrians to
redeploy in accordance with the Taif agreement. The Taif agreement states that
after the liberation of South Lebanon the Syrians should redeploy, upon which the
Lebanese state would negotiate with Syria for a full withdrawal from Lebanon.
Because of this speech, pro-Syrian Members of Parliament started to accuse the
witness of being an ‘Israeli agent’; the witness also reached a certain level
of hostility vis-à-vis the Syrian regime, including the head of the Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh, the successor of Ghazi Kanaan.
The relationship between the Syrian
President Hafez Al-Assad and Rafiq Hariri was a strong one, but when Bashar
came in power this relationship changed. For example, the Syrians and President
Lahoud were hampering all the projects and plans of Hariri. In December 2003 Rafiq
Hariri was summoned to go to Damascus to meet Bashar Al-Assad; also present
were Ghazi Kanaan, Rustom Ghazaleh and Mohammed Khallouf. According to the witness ‘[t]hat meeting was a kind of warning to Rafik
Hariri. Bashar Assad told him, "I am the one who rules here. No one rules
other than me."’
Hariri told the witness about this meeting upon his return from Damascus and he
seemed very concerned about the threats. This meeting was one of the factors
that led to the changing of Hariri’s position towards the Syrians regime;
Hariri also agreed with the witness to oppose the extension of President
Lahoud’s term. Mr Jumblatt also spoke about his
short meeting with Rustom Ghazaleh on 25 August 2004, during which
the witness expressed his opposition towards the re-election of President
Lahoud. This made Rustom Ghazaleh angry and the witness’ subsequent appointment
with Bashar Al-Assad and the planned dinner with Lahoud were cancelled by
Ghazaleh.
This witness listened to a tape
recording of a meeting between Ghazaleh and Hariri of 25 August 2004, and part
of this tape is also played in court. According to the witness, Hariri and
Ghazaleh talk about the amendment of the constitution needed to extend Lahoud’s
presidential term, with Hariri telling Ghazaleh that he will discuss his
position with President Al-Assad himself. After his visit to the Syrian
President, the witness and others met Hariri who told them that President
Al-Assad had said: ‘’Lahoud is me and I am Lahoud, I want you to extent. And if
Chirac wants to get me out of Lebanon I will break Lebanon, I will destroy
Lebanon.” Mr Jumblatt concluded that this was a direct threat, political and
physical, to Hariri, and because the witness was concerned about his life he advised Hariri to vote for the extension of Lahoud’s term. The witness however voted against
the extension and afterwards Jumblatt was involved in the Bristol group
meetings of the opposition against the Syrian presence in Lebanon; the witness
states that although Hariri supported the extension of Lahoud, “we both had the same political conviction, that it was high time for Syria
to withdraw from Lebanon pursuant to the Taif Agreement.”
Another
tape recording of a meeting between Hariri and Walid Moallem on 1 February 2005
was played in court, in which the proposed new election law and the
relationships with the Syrians were discussed. According to the witness, Hariri
“is complaining that the Syrian intelligence has tainted his reputation and his image in the mind of the Syrian president” with the Syrian
president being convinced that Hariri is behind Security Council Resolution
1559 in a conspiracy with President Chirac and the international community to
get Syria out of Lebanon. Mr Jumblatt explains that in his view this was not true as Hariri would never have
supported the article on the disarming of all (non-)Lebanese militias,
including Hezbollah, as contained in Resolution 1559. Also, during the taped
conversation, Hariri was speaking about using his
international influence with France to prevent that Hezbollah was placed on the
terrorism list.
The witness further talks about the
attempted assassination of his friend and political ally Marwan Hamade; his friend General Himat El-Chehabi told him to be careful,
which the witness interpreted as the existence of an imminent threat against
him. Also, the witness concluded from comments made by the Syrian
Vice-President that the Syrian regime was behind the attempted assassination.
Further, Hariri told him that “They will not do anything against anyone else in Lebanon. I have spoken to Chirac and Chirac sent a message, a very firm and
harsh message to Bashar Al-Assad.” The witness told Hariri that this was not
enough and to be very careful. Later on Hariri also sent his political allies
to represent him at the meetings at the Bristol Hotel, and after his
resignation Hariri and the witness set up a joint plan for the elections in
2005.
Mr Jumblatt is asked to comment on a
large number of documents from the press about his own public statements and
activities, and the main political events at that time, including his
confrontation with the Lebanese regime. The Prosecution explains that the relevance of the evidence about the witness' own political position, is its directly relation to the position that Hariri will adopt
through his alliance with the witness in late 2004 and early 2005. The evidence about the voices expressed through the
Bristol group concerning the Syrian regime is introduced by the Prosecution because Hariri indirectly joined
that group in December 2014. Hariri and the witness also made public statements
about their political alliance. On 8 February 2005, six days
before his assassination, Hariri told the witness "Either they will kill you or they will kill me."
After a very long, detailed and sometimes repetitive examination-in-chief, the Legal Representative of the
Victims is trying to draw a parallel between the assassination of the witness' father and Hariri, but the exact parallel, and the
relevance thereof for the victims, remains unclear. Subsequent cross-examination by the Defence is mainly focused on trying to show that the evidence by Mr Jumblatt consists of political accusations and lacks factual basis. For example, Defence counsel Mr
Aouini is pointing to the early accusations by the witness that the
Syrian regime is responsible for the assassination of Hariri, but that subsequently he also accused the four generals. The witness agrees that
his conclusions as to the Syrian responsibility, of which he remains convinced, are political.
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