Dr Anick van de Craats (who testified on 28 August and 1 September 2014) works
at the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). In 2005 she was working as a
forensic explosives scientists at the NFI and she was part of the team that was
sent to investigate the crime scene in Beirut following a request of UNIIIC to
the Dutch government. The team was tasked to find physical evidence and reconstruct the improvised explosive
device (IED) which caused the explosion. One of the tasks of Dr van de Craats was to
write the report on behalf of the Dutch forensic team. This
team was further composed of six colleagues with forensic police experience.
The
team was in Beirut from 11 August until 25 September 2005, that is some six
months after the explosion occurred. They checked all vehicles within a
specifically defined crime zone, searching for objects outside and underneath
the cars. After the cars were searched, they were removed from the crime scene.
During the first three weeks the focus was on searching the crime scene; after
that the team analysed and sorted all vehicle parts that were collected from
the crime scene. They were
assisted by other experts in recognising the vehicle parts, including
Prosecution witness Mr. Geyer (click here for a summary of his
evidence). Dr van de Craats took swabs from some of the items which may have
had explosive residue upon them. These swabs were taken in consultation with Dr
Murray, another Prosecution witness, and subsequently sent to Northern Ireland
for Dr Murray to analyse, whilst separate samples were also examined by the NFI
to compare the results.
Dr van de Craats explains that it is
important to look at the overall damage at the crime scene, including the
damage to the buildings and vehicles, to establish the type of explosion that
occurred. The damage to the buildings and vehicles showed that the explosion
occurred because of a detonation and had an enormous high velocity, which
caused the complete destruction of all material in the near vicinity. This also
explains why there is a crater. A detonation also can cause ceilings or walls
to be moved, and this type of damage was found at the St. George and Byblos
hotels. Further, the horizontal perforations of the vehicles show that there
had been a horizontal blast force. Based on this and other characteristics of
the crime scene (bent columns at the St. Georges Hotel and a slided wall at the Byblos Hotel) Dr van de Craats concludes that it must have
been an explosion above the ground. The movement of asphalt is not conclusive
for either an underground or above-ground explosion.
The team also had the opportunity to
examine the convoy vehicles, which were retained at the Helou barracks, a
guarded police compound; although these vehicles were covered by blue plastic
they showed sever rust. The damage to these cars was used to determine their
position to the explosion centre. The team compared the remains of the three
most damaged vehicles: the black Mercedes 404, the Red Ford and the Mitsubishi
Canter. They concluded that the Mitsubishi Canter was the most damaged vehicle,
with only small parts being recovered, therefore supporting the hypothesis that
this was the bomb-carrying vehicle. Further, the Red Ford could not have
contained the IED because the damage to the carcass came from the rear left and
thus from the outside the vehicle.
During
cross-examination, Mr. Edwards (representing the interests of the accused
Badreddine) is confronting the witness with the differences between the
position of vehicles at the maps of the crime scene drawn by the Dutch team,
and the maps of the Lebanese police (ISF). According to a comparison presented
by Mr. Edwards, the difference between the maps show addition and removal of
vehicles. Dr van de Craats explains that it is difficult to state if these are
real differences, given a lack of a common reference points, and if so, what
would be the reason for those differences. Also, she states that these
differences do not affect the conclusions of her report. Dr van de Craats
further explains that at the time of the investigations they already noted the
differences, but “we talked to the UNIIIC investigators and we all
accepted the fact that we could only start our crime scene search six months
after the explosion occurred, and our task was to record the crime scene at
that moment as best as we could.” The Prosecution does not dispute that the
convoy vehicles and at least one other vehicle were moved; further, it takes
the view that the variations in the maps are “simply map-drawer's
perspectives”.
The Dutch forensic team further included a
number of police officers with specific crime scene experience, one of them
being Jan Kuitert, a (now retired)
crime scene investigator from the police with experience in explosives. Jan
Kuitert gave evidence on 11 September 2014. He explains that each Dutch team
member was assigned 4-5 Lebanese police investigators, and they systematically
searched the crime scene; the team inspected and removed over 100 vehicles, and
located and photographed numerous car parts.
[screenshot of witness Jan Kuitert]
The overall conclusions of the Dutch report
"Forensic investigation of
the explosion which occurred on the 14th of February, 2005, in Beirut, Lebanon." of 30 September 2005
are as follows:
(i) Detonation of high explosive
“The damage inflicted on the buildings, vehicles, surrounding lamp-posts and other objects in the vicinity of the
explosion site demonstrate that a large amount of high explosives was activated
and detonated to the left side in
front of the main entrance of the St. Georges Hotel on the Rue Minet el Hos' n.
This detonation set fire to many
vehicles within a distance of 20 to 30 metres of the explosion centre. From the damage pattern it was clear that it
was one explosion of a charge of high
explosive.”
(ii) The Mitsubishi Canter as bomb vehicle “Regarding
the physical evidence recovered, the human remains identified by Dr Ayoub, the
HSBC security video, and the damage on vehicles parked on the road, the most
likely scenario is that a Mitsubishi
Canter van containing the improvised explosive device (IED) was activated when
the Hariri convoy of six vehicles drove by. The engine number of this Mitsubishi Canter was found among the debris on
the crime scene. This number led
to the vehicle registration number and the production date of Mitsubishi Canter
van which was manufactured in Japan.
No remains of the constituents of the IED have been
found among the debris, apart from the vehicle parts of the Mitsubishi Canter
in which the IED was most probably placed. Because of the size of the explosion and the exploded charge this is not
unexpected. A few damaged parts
of circuit boards have been recovered which may be related to an activation mechanism. However, these circuit boards
should first be examined by electronics
experts, who might give an indication of the origin and application of these
boards.”
(iii) Location of convoy vehicles and bomb vehicle “When the explosive device was activated, the Mitsubishi Canter was
parked almost in line with the other parked vehicles along the pavement in front of the St. Georges Hotel with the
front of the vehicle facing west. It was not parked fully in line judging from
the direction of the explosion force acted
on the red Ford vehicle which was most likely
parked directly in front of the Mitsubishi. This red Ford vehicle was most severely damaged from the left rear side
which means that the Mitsubishi could not have been parked fully in line with
the red Ford vehicle.
Of the six convoy vehicles, the black Mercedes
numbered 404 was closest to the explosion
centre when the IED detonated. The direction of the explosive force on this vehicle was from the right side, meaning it was most likely located
alongside the Mitsubishi. From the damage patterns it can be stated that the vehicles 401, 402, and 403, the
latter with Hariri and Fuleihan as occupants, had just passed by the Mitsubishi
when the explosion occurred. Vehicles 405 and 406 have been damaged most
severely at the right front side, meaning that these vehicles had not yet driven by the Mitsubishi at the moment of the
detonation.“
(iv) Activation of IED “Regarding
the physical evidence presented in this report and the fact that small human remains of an up-to-now unidentified person have been found and no large body parts, such as legs,
feet, or underarms, the most likely scenario for the activation of the IED is a
suicide bomber. Another only less likely
possibility is that of a remotely controlled device. However, no residues of such device have been recovered from the crime scene.”
Mr. Kuitert gives a good explanation of
the most important caveat to the conclusions of the report because of
possible contamination of the crime scene by stating that “when you carry out
an investigation half a year after the incident and even if the crime scene
has been under surveillance during
that time, you can never be sure that the crime scene is as it was shortly after the explosion.”
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