Journalist Mr. Salman testifies from Beirut

On 8th January, Prosecution witness Mr. Faisal Salman testified by video link from the STL office in Beirut. He is both a media advisor and a journalist for Future News, and was present in the Café de L’Étoile at the invitation of the late Prime Minister Mr. Hariri, when the latter left Parliament and walked across the square and entered the cafe just prior to the assassination on Valentine's Day in 2005. The witness had had frequent contact with Mr. Hariri and they had a strong personal relationship, telephoning each other several times per week.

[Screenshot of Mr. Salman]

The witness speaks about the political preferences of Mr. Hariri, including the Taif Agreement. Hariri would say that the Taif Agreement was clear, and that the Syrian presence in Lebanon was necessary, legal and provisional. From the mid-1990s until 2000, Mr. Hariri avoided to talk about the Syrian presence in Lebanon with journalists. According to this witness, Mr. Hariri would later say that "it is not an imperative necessity to have a Syrian presence in Lebanon, […] those who protect Syria are the nationalists in Lebanon".

There were several contentious issues that were being discussed in Parliament at the time, including Syria's presence in Lebanon, Hezbollah's weapons, economic policies in the country and the extension of President Lahoud's mandate.

It had been Abu Tareq aka Yahya El-Arab, Mr. Hariri's security officer, who had invited the witness and another journalist for coffee at the Café de L’Étoile on the 14th February 2005. The other journalist was Mohammed Chqeir, also a close friend of Hariri's. There were several other colleagues also present at the cafe that day. When Mr. Hariri arrived at the cafe that day, he talked about his position on UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1566 dealing with the situation in Lebanon. Mr. Hariri did not make a particularly worried or afraid impression, according to the witness. Whilst at the cafe, Hariri had said that Lebanon cannot be governed from Syria.

Syria in the dock: Witness Hamade testifies at the STL

The week of 17 November started with the second part of the Prosecution's case at the Lebanon Tribunal. This phase will consist of some twelve parts, starting with several witnesses providing background evidence of certain political events prior to the 14 February 2005 assassination. Mr. Marwan Hamade is the first Prosecution witness to testify in this second phase, and he spent eight days in the courtroom providing testimony to the Court.

Defence attempts to block Mr. Hamade's testimony

During legal arguments preceding the testimony of Mr. Hamade, the Prosecution asked the Trial Chamber to allow it to present evidence against the Syrian regime and its President Bashar Assad in its case. The Chamber indeed allowed the Prosecution to go forward and the first political witness the Prosecution called to the stand was Mr. Hamade.

[Screenshot of Mr. Hamade testifying before the STL.]

Mr. Hamade was a close political associate of Mr. Hariri and a Lebanese cabinet minister who was intimately involved in many of the events at the time and was himself victim of an assassination attempt in Lebanon in October 2004, a case that might also be subject to further investigations by this Tribunal. He is currently a Member of Parliament and deputy for the Chouf District. On 13 November, the Prosecution outlined that Mr. Hamade's testimony (and the testimony of twelve further Prosecution witnesses) would highlight five themes: (1) Mr. Hariri's deteriorating relationship with Syria as a consequence of his goal to strengthen Lebanese autonomy; (2) Syria's corresponding increasing resolve to exert control over Lebanese internal affairs; (3) growing concerns voiced by the international community regarding external pressures bearing upon the political affairs of Lebanon; (4) the evolution of an effective opposition movement since September 2004 of which Mr. Hariri was first a silent and then a more public participant; and (5) Mr. Hariri's status as an influential statesman in the Gulf region and beyond. 

With Mr. Hamade's testimony, the Prosecution hopes to bring to light the political tensions prevailing at the time preceding Mr. Hariri's assassination, and though it fails to specify a motive in the indictment against the five accused, arguing that the accused's personal motives are either non-existent or irrelevant, it hopes to bring to light the political motives for the assassination by providing these witnesses' testimonies to the court. Defence counsel vehemently objected to the hearing of Mr. Hamade's testimony in regard of his meetings with Syrian President Assad and Mr. Hariri as well as General Rustom Ghazaleh, the Syrian chief of intelligence in Lebanon at the time. The basis for their objection was that aspect of his proposed testimony was irrelevant and not pleaded in the indictment or the Prosecution's opening statements. However, the Trial Chamber ruled that the STL has an inclusionary approach towards receiving evidence, and that it may admit any relevant evidence. It regards evidence of the prevailing political situation in Lebanon in 2004 and early 2005 as potentially relevant and thus allows the Prosecution to call Mr. Hamade as a witness.

Testimony-in-chief of Mr. Hamade

The witness began his political career in 1977 and was almost continuously a Member of Parliament until 1990 and also held significant ministerial positions. He testified about the process of limiting Syria's role in Lebanon, starting with the Taif Agreement in 1989 between Lebanon, Syria and Saoudi Arabia that envisioned national reconciliation between Syria and Lebanon. In describing the years following this Taif Agreement and subsequent agreements between the two countries, the witness describes the relationship between Lebanon and Syria as follows:

"the years that followed, the first years, were years of hope. The years that followed those were years of deception and the last years were those of breaking down and despair."

The agreements, instead of as depicted by its texts leading to close cooperation, led to influence, intervention and hegemony by the Syrian state. He explained that the agreements were accepted by him and Mr. Hariri 

"a Syrian umbrella over Lebanon, but we considered that this umbrella would be lifted gradually with the reconstruction of Lebanon, with the reconstruction of Lebanese institutions, the disbanding of the militias, and the withdrawal, the complete Israeli withdrawal."

The witness further noted that when the father of the current Syrian President, Hafez Assad, passed away, there were many promises and hopes that Syria would become more open, though in fact, the opposite happened. Syria's grip on Lebanon became tighter, and President Hariri was restricted in the formation of his first and second governments in 2000 and 2003 respectively. Hamade stated that "we were facing a group that wanted to influence more and more the Lebanese institutions, political, security, economic and financial institutions". The witness depicted Mr. Hariri as a man of compromise, someone who would always continue to talk to the enemy. But by April 2003, Mr. Hariri was completely paralysed, and Syria wanted to pave the way for the re-election of Emile Lahoud as president, though they pretended that Lebanon would be free to choose its president. 

From the year 2000 onwards, freedom in Lebanon was more and more reduced because of Syrian tutelage.  The witness also extensively spoke about the period from 2003 onwards, when Mr. Hariri returned from a visit to Damascus; "he was humiliated by the president of Syria to prove that the people in charge in Lebanon were considered as no one, nothing, to the Syrians and no one should mistake the orders of Damascus". Mr. Hariri was forced by Al-Assad to cooperate with General Emile Lahoud, the Lebanese President who was acted in the name of the Syrian regime. However, Mr. Hariri did not accept full hegemony by Syria and their intelligence on Lebanese politics. In 2003/2004, the witness describes that Mr. Hariri and Mr. Lahoud's relationship had severely deteriorated. He also indicated that Syria was wire-tapping the telephones of Mr. Hariri and Mr. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party in Lebanon.

Mr. Hamade stated in this regard that Syria pressured Lebanon to transform its democratic parliamentary system to a presidential system where President Emile Lahoud was to grab all power and all other political actors would be subsidiary to his power. Instead, Mr. Hariri was attempting to form a government of national unity, a neutral government consisting of moderate ministers. 

Under pressure from Syria, Prime Minister Hariri resigned from his post on 20 October 2004. After his resignation, the campaign against him aggravated, very openly. The international community had made a resolution that demanded the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, and the pro-Syrian forces accused Mr. Hariri of having encouraged this; however, witness Hamade testifies that Mr. Hariri had not been involved in this. Mr. Hariri had been confident about winning the next elections in Lebanon in the Spring of 2005, in spite of all actions taken by Syria. Though information about Mr. Hariri's safety being threatened became more intense, according to witness Hamade, he was never sufficiently concerned about his own safety. 

Cross-examination of Mr. Hamade

In cross-examination, Mr. Hamade testified to the cooperation between the late Mr. Hariri and Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and their creation of an alliance for the legislative elections of 2005. Badreddine's lawyer Antoine Korkmaz suggested that there was a broad alliance between Mr. Hariri and Hezbollah, thus undermining the Prosecution's theory that the relationship between these two had severely deteriorated in the period leading up to the assassination on 14 February 2005. After the assassination, Mr. Hamade secretly met with Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, and he asked the latter about Hezbollah's involvement in the attack on his own life at the end of 2004. He denied Hezbollah had anything to do with that, but when he asked "Did the Syrian brothers have a role?", Nasrallah responded by saying that he did not know. 

In cross-examination, counsel for Badreddine Mr. Korkmaz attempted to discredit this witness by saying he was biased against the accused persons, basing his questioning on previous interviews given by Mr. Hamade to the Lebanese press. The accusation that he lacked neutrality did not affect Mr. Hamade very much, who simply responded by saying that he is a political figure and that his statements should be understood in that light.

A paramedic in Mr. Hariri's convoy ambulance testifies

The next witness on the stand was Mr. Rachid Hammoud, a Lebanese paramedic. He testifies that in 2004, there was always one ambulance accompanying Mr. Hariri's convoy, another was kept ready for special circumstances. One ambulance would have one driver and two paramedics. The ambulance would always be the last car in the convoy. On the 14th February 2005, the day of the explosion, the witness sat in the back of the ambulance, so he did not see what happened outside. As a result of the explosion, the witness fainted, and when he regained his conscience, he climbed outside of the ambulance through the roof.

Mr. Hariri's paramedic team consisted of ten paramedics. Whenever he would travel with his convoy, also abroad, the ambulance would follow the convoy. When traveling by plane, medical suitcases would be brought along.

The witness estimates that the ambulance was at approximately 50 meters distance from the last car in the convoy, though this distance is fiercely debated during cross-examination of this witness. Because of this distance, normally the jammers would not affect the radio. If the car would come closer than that, you would hear some buzzing, and you would not be able to make any calls. 

Prosecution witnesses who were working for Mr. Hariri

The week of 11 November saw the end of the first phase of the Prosecution's case. The first witness to testify this week from Leidschendam, the seat of the Tribunal, was Mr. Mohammed Mneimneh who was the assistant to the head of protocol office of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. He testified about his role and responsibilities in the protocol office, Mr. Hariri's typical daily schedule and lifestyle patterns and his agenda, including his visits to Quraitem Palace.

First witness this week: Mr. Mneimneh

[Screenshot of Mr. Mohammed Mneimneh.]

The witness started working for Mr. Hariri in 1999 and worked under the late Wissam Al-Hassan where he was responsible for keeping Mr. Hariri's agenda. He arranged the appointments and visitors, organised his trips; he and his team would travel in advance to arrange for Mr. Hariri's trips inside and outside of Lebanon. The witness describes a typical day of Mr. Hariri, waking up early and would meet with people that he knew, close associates and businessmen, who did not have appointments but who wanted to meet with him. He describes the nine floor building of Quraitem Palace where Mr. Hariri's office was located. The appointments Mr. Hariri had with representatives of Hezbollah were not noted down in the agenda as they were not arranged through the Protocol Department but through intermediaries or through Mr. Hariri himself. The witness would only know of these appointments after they had occurred. The Prosecution tenders parts of Mr. Hariri's agenda into evidence, and some of the details thereof are discussed in the courtroom.

That same day, 11th November, the Defence started its cross-examination of Mr. Mneimneh. One of the issues Mr. Korkmaz, counsel for accused Mr. Baddreddine, questions the witness about Mr. Wissam El-Hassan's absence from work on Monday 14 February 2005, the day of the assassination. Mr. El-Hassan called the witness the preceding Saturday to inform the latter that he would have an exam at the Lebanese university on Monday and hence would be absent from work that day. Mr. Korkmaz's cross-examination continued on 12th November. The witness is asked about a scheduled appointment with Mr. Ayad Allawi on 14th February 2005 that had been cancelled, though the witness states he was unaware of that. The next in line to cross-examine the witness is Mr. Young defending the interests of accused Sabra. Mr. Young questioned the witness about, inter alia, the importance of the election time in January and February 2005. Mr. Young further discusses the resignation of Mr. Wissam El-Hassan from the Internal Security Forces (ISF) on 10 February 2005, four days before the fatal assassination. Also, prior to his assassination, Mr. Hariri had personal concerns about his safety and sometimes failed to give advance notice of his movements, even to his protocol team. Ms. Le Fraper, lawyer defending the interests of the fifth accused Mr. Merhi, also questions the witness in respect of the scheduling of the secret meetings Mr. Hariri had, which, the witness states, were organised by Mr. Wissam El-Hassan or through Mr. Hariri himself or intermediaries, but there was no clear record of that type of visitors.

Second witness this week: Mr. Al-Daouq
The second, and last, witness to testify this week on 12 and 13 November, was Mr. Maarouf Al-Daouq, who was the head of the Lebanese Press Office for the President of the Council of Ministers. In his testimony-in-chief, he talked about his role and responsibilities in the creation of press releases, the publishing and circulation thereof and the structure and format of such press releases. When Mr. Hariri resigned as Prime Minister, the witness was asked to work with Mr. Hariri on a full-time basis at the Quraitem Palace. His responsibilities included covering news, activities and events related to Mr. Hariri and he would make arrangements to cover those events. Counsel for the Prosecution, Ms. Bari, takes the witness through several of the press releases that were issued prior to the assassination of Mr. Hariri. The witness discussed the resignation of Mr. Hariri as Prime Minister on 20 October 2004, and his involvement in the formation of the subsequent government; there were attempts to nominate Mr. Hariri again as Prime Minister in the new government. However, when all discussions and negotiations on this topic failed, he submitted his final resignation. Mr. Iain Edwards for the accused Badreddine started the cross-examination of this witness. The 171 press releases that this witness provided on a CD to the Prosecution have not yet been admitted into evidence, and the questioning of this witness is not about the content of those documents. Unfortunately, when they will be admitted, the STL website will probably not allow the public to read these exhibits.

Courageous decision by STL Contempt Judge ignoring Appeals Chamber decision to prosecute corporate entities

On 6 November Judge Lettieri, the Contempt Judge in the two contempt cases, decided to bypass a previous ruling by the Appeals Chamber, and instead ruled that the Lebanon Tribunal does not have the right to prosecute corporate entities, thereby ignoring the legal precedent previously set by the Appeals Chamber.

The cases

The Lebanon Tribunal (STL) is currently dealing with two separate contempt cases, dealing with similar substantive issues. The first is against NEW TV S.A.L. and Ms. Karma Al Khayat (Case No. STL-14-05) and the second against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Mr. Ibrahim Mohamed Al Amin (Case No. STL-14-06). In both cases, the defendants, both natural and corporate, are accused of having published names of individuals alleged to be witnesses before the Tribunal. If proved, the defendants will be guilty of contempt of court. 

In the first contempt case against Ms. Al Khayat and her media corporation NEW TV S.A.L., Judge Lettieri had previously come to the conclusion that Ms. Khayat could indeed be prosecuted for contempt of court, but that her employer, the media corporation NEW TV, could not be prosecuted, as there is no basis in the laws governing the Tribunal for the prosecution of legal persons. The Amicus Prosecutor in charge of the contempt prosecutions appealed against Judge Lettieri's decision, and the Appeals Chamber ruled in favour of the Amicus appeal and concluded that not only natural persons, but also legal persons could be prosecuted by the Tribunal for contempt of court.

The second contempt case: Largely the same substance

In case STL-14-06, Judge Lettieri now faced the same legal issue as in the first case (though he argues in paragraph 73 that the facts of the case slightly differ). Having a clear previous ruling from the higher legal body of this Tribunal on this very particular issue, Judge Lettieri nonetheless decided to bypass the unambiguous ruling by the Appeals Chamber by insisting that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to prosecute legal persons.

Discussion: Principle of legality

The substance of the discussion boils down to the principal of legality, i.e. whether the defendant, in this case the legal person of NEW T.V., could have been aware of the possibility of prosecution by this Tribunal for contempt of court. Judge Lettieri convincingly argues that NEW T.V. could not have been aware of this, and then the conclusion must be that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, for an accused must be able to foresee that his behaviour will be judged criminal by a court.

Judge Lettieri extensively criticises the Appeals Chamber's analysis and argumentation in concluding that it could prosecute the legal person, even accusing the Appeals Chamber of citing "misleading" developments (paragraph 47) and of violating the legality principle (paragraph 51). Judge Lettieri considers:

45. In sum, the interpretation of Rule 60 bis is clear: the Rule is not ambiguous. It does not explicitly provide for the prosecution of legal persons. Even if one were to resort to interpretation as to what Rule 60 bis might implicitly mean, I believe that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Rules in their context and in the light of their object and purpose (as required by Rule 3), an interpretation of "any person who" encompassing legal persons would not sufficiently put on notice a corporate accused that it could incur criminal liability (footnotes omitted).

In his critique of the Appeals Chamber's decision, Judge Lettieri notably argues that in the same line of reasoning, the Tribunal could then prosecute States and international organisations for contempt of court (paragraph 53). He further criticises the Appeals Chamber's motive of effectiveness in concluding that legal persons should be included in its jurisdiction (paragraph 59). 

The discussion here is whether the Judge should indeed blindly follow the jurisprudence set by the Appeals Chamber, or whether he ultimately has to follow his own legal reasoning and instinct in coming to a conclusion in such matter.

Conclusion

We fully agree with the substance of the reasoning of Judge Lettieri (see here and here for our criticism of the Appeals Chamber's decision to allow prosecution of corporate entities), though at the same time acknowledging that in principle, the Judge should have been bound by the Appeals Chamber's decision. Blatantly ignoring jurisprudence of a higher body in the legal hierarchy is not done, to say the very least.

In principle, decisions by a higher legal authority are binding over lower judicial instances. Judge Lettieri discusses this in a separate section of his appeal (paragraph 66 ff.), acknowledging "the general need for consistency, certainty and predictability in the judicial decision-making at this Tribunal". However, Judge Lettieri correctly considers that at this Tribunal the Appeals Chamber's decisions do not create binding precedents. 

It is clear from the wording of Judge Lettieri's decision that he has not come to this conclusion lightly, but that his sense of justice required him to do this. He could have easily followed the Appeals Chamber decision, and no one could have criticised him for doing that, but instead, he decided to go against the flow and follow his own conscience. It was an unexpected and unconventional step to take, but a courageous one nonetheless.

The Appeals Chamber will undoubtedly again reverse this legal reasoning by Judge Lettieri. However, the fact that this Judge reiterated his position in this second contempt decision, combined with the fact that the Appeals Chamber decision was only decision by majority (Judge Akoum dissented), gives force to the argument that this Tribunal should not prosecute legal entities, and it may very well have an effect on this decision forming a precedent for future tribunals and courts trying to build on this for establishing jurisdiction over legal entities.

Witnesses testify about the jammers in Hariri's motorcade at the Lebanon Tribunal

In the week preceding 20-23 October 2014 (see here, here and here) several Prosecution witnesses testified about jammers in the motorcade, blocking transmissions by cell phones by emitting signals that block electronic devices that may be used to set off bombs. And again on 12 December another witness testified about the jamming systems.

Three of the cars of the former Prime Minister's motorcade had jammers installed. The witnesses all testify that at the beginning of each trip they made with Mr. Hariri,  they would turn on the jammers and verify whether they were operational. If their cell phones or car radios were still operational, the jammer would not have been properly turned on.

The Prosecution's case seems to be that, given that all cars in the convoy contained such jamming devices, the bomb killing the former Prime Minister could not have been set off by a remote electronic device. The defence has cast doubt on this theory by revealing evidence from some of the Prosecution witnesses that at least one of the jammers was not functioning properly, thus allowing for an alternative assassination theory.

The week of 20-23 October saw two further witnesses testify about the technology of electronic countermeasures.

On 20th and 21st October, witness PRH507 testified under protective measures. This person has been working in the field of electronic countermeasures, more specifically, jammers and he delivered the jamming systems for Mr. Hariri's convoy. He explains that a jammer works within a specified band of frequencies within which it distributes signals that prevent receivers from communicating with the transmitters that belong to them. The transmitters cannot reach the receivers anymore, because the signal is being blocked.

Witness PRH507 inspected the jammers in three of the vehicles in January 2005, one month before the assassination, and they were functioning properly at that time. He further speaks about the impact of weather conditions on the functioning of the systems. The witness is also asked about the possibility of someone having used a satellite telephone to set off the bomb; the witness explains that topographically, Beirut is a complicated city, and using a satellite telephone for such purpose would be difficult.

After the explosion, the jammers were examined at the Beirut police headquarters; all of the switches were in "on" position (though one was completely destroyed). Also the jammer in the fifth convoy vehicle was switched on. However, the antenna cables were violently torn out of the plugs, and the witness indicates that this is strange. It is impossible to know whether they had been working at the time of the explosion.

At the end of the first day of his testimony, cross-examination of this witness commenced, and continued into the next day. The witness was presented three different possibilities regarding the setting off of the bomb, and asked to comment upon those. The first concerns the theory of a suicide bomber who receives a call, and he can see the convoy and then triggers the detonation. In the second theory there is no suicide bomber, but a timer that receives a call from a transmitter via a relay post. The call is logged before the jammers turn up, and a few seconds later the bomb goes off. The witness says these two theories are feasible. The third theory, however, he does not find feasible. In this theory, a phone connected to a transmitter is hanged up by a person, and that hanging up triggers the bomb to go off. The witness indicates that the act of hanging up on the part of the transmitter becomes more unlikely the closer the convoy gets to the recipient. The witness says that he has never seen a device that triggers the detonation of a bomb through the mere act of hanging up, though he concedes such device may exist.

The witness then testifies about the second car in the convoy, and how they found that several of the cables had been professionally deinstalled, while others had been ripped out by sheer brute force, and the witness adds that "[i]t's difficult to imagine that it could have been caused by the explosion". He also tells the court that the control light of the jammers would have still been on in the second convoy car, in spite of them not being operational given that the linking equipment to the antennae was disassembled or cut, though they would control the device by checking their mobile phones which would have warned them of the mechanical problem.

The witness is confronted with a statement from another witness who worked close to the place of the assassination. The latter witness testifies that she was watching television when the convoy of Mr. Hariri passed by. Normally, the jammers would affect her television, but on this particular day, the television was not affected. Witness PRH507 indicated in response that normally, one would conclude from this that the jammers were switched off.

The subsequent Prosecution witness PRH256, testifying on 22 and shortly 23 October, was one of the drivers for the Hariri family. Normally he would drive the former Prime Minister around in Lebanon, but on occasion they would travel abroad. The witness was in charge of activating the jammers in his vehicle, and they were constantly turned on. On the particular day, 14 February 2005, the witness drove the ambulance that followed Mr. Hariri's convoy. During the route, the radio was turned on, though it was interrupted once or twice. Normally, he would drive at a distance behind the other vehicles. In case of an explosion, the ambulance and people driving it must be safe. He is asked extensively about the distance of his vehicle to the convoy itself, but the witness states he no longer remembers this precisely, though stresses it would be no more than 15 metres. However, in a previous statement, the witness had indicated that when driving 50 metres away from the convoy, they would be able to listen to the radio.

In a previous statement to the UN investigation commission, the witness had indicated he thought the convoy had been followed by a suspicious car, an Opel Senator car, though he didn't consider it a threat at the time.

On 12 December, Mr. Diab testified by video-link from the office in Beirut about jammers in Mr. Hariri's motorcade. The witness worked for the Hariri family as an electronic technician, working specifically on the jamming system in the cars of the motorcade. Mr. Diab was in charge of the security equipment an systems, and, besides his colleague witness PRH507 (mentioned above), he was the only person who was allowed to touch  the jamming devices.

Mr. Diab, his colleague witness PRH507, Mr. Hariri himself and Mr Yahya El-Arab's head of security knew their specifications. Two days prior to the attack, on 12 February 2005, the systems were checked by the bodyguards, and Mr. Diab testifies that it functioned properly, for if it hadn't, the bodyguards would have informed him. The witness further indicates that even if one of the jamming systems was turned off, the other two would still work.  The jammers sent strong signals in forward directions, and weaker signals behind. The last car in the convoy was the ambulance, as indeed testified by many other witnesses before. The witness testifies that it would have been difficult to tamper with the jamming system. Mr. Diab further testified that the cars in the convoy could use radios amongst themselves, although that depended where they were. 

Witness at Lebanon Tribunal describes the assassination: "And I saw hell"

On 16 October the next Prosecution witness was also a surviver from the convoy of Mr. Hariri that was attacked on 14 February 2005 and killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Mr. Rafik Hariri and 21 others.  Like the previous testimony, Mr. Amer Chehadeh was a security guard for Mr. Hariri and had been working for the Hariri family since 1985. When Mr. Hariri became Prime Minister the witness became a close protection officer for him until the time of his assassination. This witness also traveled with Mr. Hariri throughout Lebanon and abroad.

On the day of the assassination, there was only one car of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Mr. Hariri's convoy, that was the lead vehicle. When Mr. Hariri was still Prime Minister, he had much more security than afterwards. At the time of the assassination, there were only some 35 to 40 ISF members assigned to his protection, whilst during his premiership there were some 400 protecting him.

[Screenshot of Mr. Amer Chehadeh.]

Normally, Mr. Chehadeh did not drive in the convoy, but would only do so when the team was not complete.

In the weeks leading up to the bomb attack, Mr. Abou-Tareq, the head of security, had given instructions to the security personnel to remain alert, though he testifies that they never felt any danger or threat; they never expected what happened, they never thought of that. They sometimes used a decoy technique, where they would create a second convoy, sent to act as a decoy.

In each car of the convoy, it would be the person in charge of the car who was responsible for the turning on and off of the jamming device (see yesterday's blog for Witness 76 on jamming devices). To check whether the device worked, they would turn the radio on: if the radio would no longer be operational, the device would work. Even television sets in the nearby areas would stop working when the jammers were turned on. They discuss one of Mr. Chehadeh's colleagues who was absent on 14 February 2005, the day of the assassination. That person will also be testifying in court under the pseudonym PRH247. This person still works for the Hariri family.

Mr. Chehadeh further testifies about that day, that he did not notice anything that caused him concern on that day and when reaching the St. Georges Hotel; he saw nothing out of the ordinary. This witness remembers the explosion itself, and he testifies:

"As far as I remember, I heard a loud noise and the vehicle flew. It was no longer on the ground and then it hit the ground very hard. I asked the person next to me: Are you okay? He said: Yes. I went out of the car and looked to my back and I saw hell. It was fire everywhere, smoke, and I understood that it was an explosion."

In cross-examination, the witness is asked about the vehicles of Mr. Hariri's convoy, and who would have access to them overnight. This would be virtually anyone within the residence; there were no locked doors but CCTV cameras.

Regarding the jammers, the witness testifies that they would normally check whether they were working immediately after switching them on; they would not check them again whilst driving.

The witness testifies about an ambulance that was at quite a close distance behind the convoy. In an earlier statement (a public document, but unfortunately not available on the Court's website) the witness had indicated that he had heard that the radio was on in the ambulance. Given that the effective range of the jammers was approximately hundred meters, and the ambulance was much closer to the convoy than that, the logical conclusion would be that something was wrong with the jammers.

When they arrived at the St. Georges Hotel on the particular day, the witness had not seen anything out of the ordinary; he did not see any truck or van parked outside the hotel. Double-parked vehicles were a very normal sight in Lebanon, but he saw nothing unusual. This witness finished his testimony within the day, and the subsequent witness, Mr. Dia, was sitting in the same convoy car as Mr. Chehadeh on the day of the assassination.